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ABSTRACT 
 
At the heart of the debate over the International Criminal Court lies the 
amorphous notion of globalization.  Calling into question the normative assumptions 
driving international humanitarian efforts, the evolving conception of the sovereign 
state, strategic interactions among countries and the ability of the international 
community to work multilaterally towards a common vision of justice, the debate 
spans a broad range of issues concerning global governance.  The United States’ rocky 
relationship with the International Criminal Court is a particularly revealing entry 
point.  Is the United States’ opposition simply an expression of unilateralist arrogance 
and refusal to concede to an increasingly important system of global governance that 
much of the international community accepts?  In fact, American non-support runs 
much deeper.  Both a strategic approach to United States’ foreign policy objectives 
and an examination of the ideological incompatibilities between the United States’ 
Constitution and participation in the Court reveal the centrality of sovereignty in the 
debate.  In a strategic sense, it is not in the interest of the United States to concede 
judicial autonomy to the International Criminal Court.  In an ideological sense, the 
tensions are seemingly irresolvable.  Both point to why the United States has become a 
global hegemonic power and how this hegemony plays out.  Further, both reveal just 
how deeply the International Criminal Court renegotiates state sovereignty by shifting 
the standards of international human rights law.  This thesis proceeds in three stages.  
First, it explores the position the International Criminal Court occupies in relation to 
the established tradition of international – and specifically human rights law.  Second, 
it evaluates the argument against American participation in the Court examining the 
alleged dissonance with constitutional democracy and tangible threats the institution 
poses to US foreign-relations objectives.  Finally, it places the debate in the context of   
 larger theoretical questions concerning sovereignty.  Does the Court create an 
upheaval in the global order of sovereign nations in general?  Or, does this claim of 
universality thinly veil the United States’ ultimately particular concerns about the 
maintenance of hegemony within a changing global order.  This thesis ends by 
exploring the potential alternatives for creating better agreement between the most 
deeply held ideological concerns driving the United States’ foreign policy and the 
changing demands of international political environment while questioning the 
efficacy of international criminal adjudication in achieving human rights goals.   
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